January 21 1998: E. Wayne Nafziger: Root of human

suffering

"Financial Times briefing Microsoft channel"

E. Wayne Nafziger: Root of human suffering

WEDNESDAY JANUARY 21 1998

Poverty and poor government are the main causes of

humanitarian disasters

Every month we read new stories of atrocities in countries

such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Burundi, Congo and Rwanda. The

perception that there are more such disasters than there

used to be is correct. Since 1990, the number of

humanitarian emergencies - identified by deaths and refugees

from internal conflict - has increased from 20-25 a year to

about 65-70. The number of people affected has risen several

fold to more than a million.

These increases have not been affected by just one or two

spectacular events, such as the wars in Bosnia or Rwanda. In

1997, when the violence of both those events had ebbed,

thousands of people still died from war, genocide, hunger

and disease, and millions became refugees. The same, it

seems almost certain, will be true in 1998.

Is it possible to prevent this scourge? In the short

term, refugee aid serves as bandaid. But, according to our

research at the UN University, in the longer run, there are

cheaper strategies to reduce the risk of humanitarian

disasters.

Our work, conducted by 42 scholars, used an econometric

analysis of 124 developing countries over the past 16 years,

combined with case-study evidence from 15 countries. The aim

was to examine the sources of humanitarian emergencies.

Many people believe that humanitarian disasters are

ethnically determined, arising from differences of language,

race, tribe or national origin between disputants. These

differences, it is thought, are so deeply rooted that they

are not amenable to economic and political reform; violence

cannot be avoided. That is too pessimistic a conclusion.

Our research focuses on the contribution to humanitarian

crises of two factors: national income and the role of the

government. Both provide some reasons for modest optimism,

or at least subjects for action.

It is obvious that wealth makes a huge difference, if not

to whether ethnic differences exist, but to the extent of

the problems they cause. Canada and Spain both contain

minority language regions but, despite political conflicts,

neither Quebec nor the Basque country have tipped into

humanitarian disaster. Nor has Northern Ireland, despite a

high level of violence. Wealthy countries rarely experience

humanitarian disaster.

This connection between income and disaster-avoidance is

not something that occurs only in industrial economies. Our

research shows that among the 124 developing countries a

doubling of income per person decreases the probability of a

humanitarian crisis by 13 per cent. Obviously, there are

exceptions: Sri Lanka is a relatively prosperous country

blighted by civil war. The same is true of the former

Yugoslavia.

But, by and large, the connection holds and the reason

seems to be that the poorest countries are blighted by

macro-economic instability, rapid inflation and large income

differentials. These produce feelings of relative

deprivation and crises of unfulfilled expectations, which

can be channelled into ethnic violence. This is particularly

associated with countries which are not merely poor but

which have experienced protracted economic decline

(especially of food output). More than half the countries

experiencing emergencies in the 1990s had a decline in

average incomes in the 1980s. All these provide further

reasons for seeking economic growth and stability.

The second lesson from our research concerns the

government. Humanitarian emergencies are caused mostly by

the actions of the state and only rarely by insurgents. This

was true in Rwanda, where the then government organised, and

used the media to publicise, genocide. It was also the case

in the former Yugoslavia. Governments tend to act in this

way when the economy is declining. This reduces the number

of their allies, undermining their power and increasing the

probability of political instability. To forestall such

threats, ruling elites often use political violence to steal

an even larger share of the population's income. A

particularly clear example was Sudan in the 1980s, when the

government directed violence against the politically

disobedient Dinka and Nuer tribes.

Often, the problem comes not from an aggressive

government but from the struggle between rival governing

groups for scarce resources, such as education or revenue

allocation. Examples include the struggle for oil revenues

and employment in government in Nigeria in the 1960s, and

the conflict between Hutu and Tutsi for the control of the

state and access to employment in Burundi and Rwanda.

These two factors - poverty and governmental action -

explain why Africa has suffered more than its share of

humanitarian disasters since 1980. African political leaders

faced increasing pressure from declining income. External

pressure by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and

western donors to cut the size of the state in order to

encourage economic stability in practice triggered increased

competition for governmental resources and ended up

contributing to greater instability.

An analysis of the root causes of humanitarian crises

indicates that the mechanisms for preventing them are

primarily macro-economic. Prevention requires greater

international support for income stabilisation and

adjustment planned by the developing countries themselves, a

reduction in trade barriers against Africa and Asia,

compensatory financing to cushion external economic shocks,

and rescheduling and writing down the debt of poor

countries. It would also help to reduce the international

trade in arms, which are used by governments to kill their

rivals.

For their part, low-income countries need to provide

safety nets for the poor and universal basic education,

emphasise agricultural development, and improve the capacity

of the state to collect taxes and provide services. All

these things are worth doing for other reasons. But reducing

humanitarian emergencies would be a great side benefit.

Unless it is done, the world will continue to spend vast

sums on food aid, peacekeeping and diplomacy to cope with

humanitarian emergencies.

The author is a senior research fellow and co-director

of research on humanitarian emergencies at the UN

University's World Institute for Development Economics

Research in Helsinki.

Financial Times Limited 1998